Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts

Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts

This article was published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics [©2018 Published by Oxford University Press] and the definite version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 The Article's website is at: https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/1/281/5106373

Bibliografische gegevens
Hoofdauteurs: Burchardi, Konrad B, Gulesci, Selim, Lerva, Benedetta, Sulaiman, Munshi
Andere auteurs: BRAC Institute of Governance and Development
Formaat: Journal Article
Taal:en_US
Gepubliceerd in: Oxford Academic 2022
Onderwerpen:
Agriculture
Crops
Farmers
Productivity
Online toegang:http://hdl.handle.net/10361/16284
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023
id 10361-16284
record_format dspace
spelling 10361-162842022-03-27T05:19:58Z Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts Burchardi, Konrad B Gulesci, Selim Lerva, Benedetta Sulaiman, Munshi BRAC Institute of Governance and Development Agriculture Crops Farmers Productivity This article was published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics [©2018 Published by Oxford University Press] and the definite version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 The Article's website is at: https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/1/281/5106373 Agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries. Output-sharing rules that make farmers less-than-full residual claimants are seen as a potentially important driver of low agricultural productivity. We report results from a field experiment designed to estimate and understand the effects of sharecropping contracts on agricultural input choices, risk-taking, and output. The experiment induced variation in the terms of sharecropping contracts. After agreeing to pay 50% of their output to the landlord, tenants were randomized into three groups: (i) some kept 50% of their output; (ii) others kept 75%; (iii) others kept 50% of output and received a lump-sum payment at the end of their contract, either fixed or stochastic. We find that tenants with higher output shares used more inputs, cultivated riskier crops, and produced 60% more output relative to control. Income or risk exposure have at most a small effect on farm output; the increase in output should be interpreted as an incentive effect of the output-sharing rule. Published 2022-02-20T08:54:20Z 2022-02-20T08:54:20Z 2018 2018 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/10361/16284 https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 en_US https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/1/281/5106373 The Quarterly Journal of Economics Oxford Academic
institution Brac University
collection Institutional Repository
language en_US
topic Agriculture
Crops
Farmers
Productivity
spellingShingle Agriculture
Crops
Farmers
Productivity
Burchardi, Konrad B
Gulesci, Selim
Lerva, Benedetta
Sulaiman, Munshi
Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
description This article was published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics [©2018 Published by Oxford University Press] and the definite version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 The Article's website is at: https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/1/281/5106373
author2 BRAC Institute of Governance and Development
author_facet BRAC Institute of Governance and Development
Burchardi, Konrad B
Gulesci, Selim
Lerva, Benedetta
Sulaiman, Munshi
format Journal Article
author Burchardi, Konrad B
Gulesci, Selim
Lerva, Benedetta
Sulaiman, Munshi
author_sort Burchardi, Konrad B
title Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
title_short Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
title_full Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
title_fullStr Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
title_full_unstemmed Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
title_sort moral hazard: experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
publisher Oxford Academic
publishDate 2022
url http://hdl.handle.net/10361/16284
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023
work_keys_str_mv AT burchardikonradb moralhazardexperimentalevidencefromtenancycontracts
AT gulesciselim moralhazardexperimentalevidencefromtenancycontracts
AT lervabenedetta moralhazardexperimentalevidencefromtenancycontracts
AT sulaimanmunshi moralhazardexperimentalevidencefromtenancycontracts
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