01993cas a2200325 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000126 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451846607 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Feldman, Robert. Auction Format Matters : Evidenceon Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue / Robert Feldman, Vincent Reinhart. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1995. 1 online resource (30 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper evaluates the importance of auction format on bidding behavior and seller revenue, focusing on differences in performance under uniform-price and discriminatory-price formats. The analysis is based on a standard benchmark model from which empirically-testable hypotheses are derived on the optimal amount of bid shading that generates revenue equivalence between the two formats. Applying this model to data from the IMF gold auctions run in 1976-80, we find evidence of statistically significant shading in excess of the theoretically-derived optimum under the discriminatory format. This evidence suggests greater seller revenue under the uniform-price format. Mode of access: Internet Auction Format imf Discriminatory-Price Auction imf Price imf Uniform-Price Auction imf WP imf United States imf Reinhart, Vincent. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1995/047 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1995/047/001.1995.issue-047-en.xml IMF e-Library