01909cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000136 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451850079 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1996. 1 online resource (42 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper develops a political-economy model of the budget process focusing on the common pool problem of the public budget. We show that the externality arising from the fact that public spending tends to be targeted at individual groups in society while the tax burden is widely dispersed creates a bias towards excessive expenditures and debt. This bias can be reduced by introducing elements of centralization in the budget process, that is, institutional structures that strengthen a comprehensive view of the budget over the particularistic view of the spending ministers and the members of parliament. Using examples from EC countries, we show how budget processes lack or possess such elements. We then present empirical evidence supporting the claim that centralizing elements reduce the deficit bias. The last section concludes with models for reform of the budget process. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1996/078 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1996/078/001.1996.issue-078-en.xml IMF e-Library