01831cas a2200313 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000307 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451974423 1934-7456 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Dhonte, Pierre. Conditionality as an Instrument of Borrower Credibility / Pierre Dhonte. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997. 1 online resource (18 pages) IMF Policy Discussion Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Fund member countries that adopt market-friendly policies often encounter a credibility problem-market-friendly policies are not effective in stimulating private investment as long as there remains a significant risk of policy reversal. The root of this risk lies in the discretionary policy-making authority of governments. Committing to a program with the Fund, and endorsing its conditionality, is one instrument available to governments to overcome this difficulty. The paper develops this interpretation of conditionality and indicates some of its operational implications for Fund programs. Mode of access: Internet Financing imf Fund imf Market imf PDP imf Policy imf United States imf IMF Policy Discussion Papers; Policy Discussion Paper ; No. 1997/002 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/003/1997/002/003.1997.issue-002-en.xml IMF e-Library