01829cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000326 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451844764 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Prem, Roohi. International Currencies and Endogenous Enforcement : An Empirical Analysis / Roohi Prem. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997. 1 online resource (57 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper investigates the determinants of the international role of a currency. It argues that standard determinants such as monetary performance and financial openness are at best imperfect indicators of a currency's stability prospects, because the issuer's promise of stability is not exogenously enforceable. The paper advocates an enforcement approach to international currencies that make explicit the underlying incentive incompatibilities. Additional enforcement determinants of currency internationalization are identified. The model is estimated using time-series cross-sectional analysis for three data sets. Monetary performance-related standard determinants fail to exhibit explanatory power, whereas the enforcement determinants are strongly significant and robust. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1997/029 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1997/029/001.1997.issue-029-en.xml IMF e-Library