01554cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000327 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451844627 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Market Information and Signaling in Central Bank Operations, or, How Often Should a Central Bank Intervene? Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997. 1 online resource (28 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students A central bank must decide on the frequency with which it will conduct open market operations and the variability in short-term money market that it will allow. It is shown how the optimal operating procedure balances the value of attaining an immediate target and broadcasting the central bank's intentions against the informational advantages to the central bank of allowing the free play of market forces to reveal more of the information available to market participants. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1997/028 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1997/028/001.1997.issue-028-en.xml IMF e-Library