01556cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000391 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451849424 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Corruption and the Rate of Temptation : Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption? Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997. 1 online resource (56 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1997/073 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1997/073/001.1997.issue-073-en.xml IMF e-Library