01569cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000410 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451851878 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Levy Yeyati, Eduardo. Public Disclosure and Bank Failures / Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Tito Cordella. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997. 1 online resource (25 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines how public disclosure of banks' risk exposure affects banks' risk-taking incentives and assesses how the presence of informed depositors influences the soundness of the banking system. It finds that, when banks have complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolios, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking crises. However, when banks do not control their risk exposure, the presence of informed depositors may increase the probability of bank failures. Mode of access: Internet Cordella, Tito. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1997/096 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1997/096/001.1997.issue-096-en.xml IMF e-Library