01653cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000436 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451852363 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Chand, Sheetal. Controlling Fiscal Corruption / Sheetal Chand, Karl Moene. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997. 1 online resource (17 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. First, a case study of a successful attack on corruption is presented that shows the importance of attending to the conditions of service of fiscal officers. Second, a model is developed drawing on the conclusions of the case study that shows their consistency with optimization behavior. It confirms that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a virtuous circle. Mode of access: Internet Moene, Karl. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1997/100 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1997/100/001.1997.issue-100-en.xml IMF e-Library