01833cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000462 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451929515 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Tanzi, Vito. Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth / Vito Tanzi, Hamid Davoodi. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997. 1 online resource (23 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Corruption, particularly political or 'grand' corruption, distorts the entire decision-making process connected with public investment projects. The degree of distortions is higher with weaker auditing institutions. The evidence presented shows that higher corruption is associated with (i) higher public investment; (ii) lower government revenues; (iii) lower expenditures on operations and maintenance; and (iv) lower quality of public infrastructure. The evidence also shows that corruption increases public investment while reducing its productivity. These are five channels through which corruption lowers growth. An implication is that economists should be more restrained in their praise of high public sector investment, especially in countries with high corruption. Mode of access: Internet Davoodi, Hamid. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1997/139 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1997/139/001.1997.issue-139-en.xml IMF e-Library