01437cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000713 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451855258 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Cordella, Tito. Can Short-Term Capital Controls Promote Capital Inflows? / Tito Cordella. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1998. 1 online resource (10 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students In an economy a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if, and only if, the emerging market government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. This implies that capital controls that are effective in reducing the vulnerability of emerging markets to financial crises may increase the volume of capital inflows. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1998/131 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1998/131/001.1998.issue-131-en.xml IMF e-Library