Can Short-Term Capital Controls Promote Capital Inflows? /
In an economy a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if, and only if, the emerging market government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. This implies that capital controls that are effective in reduci...
| Autor principal: | Cordella, Tito |
|---|---|
| Format: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicat: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1998.
|
| Col·lecció: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1998/131 |
| Accés en línia: | Full text available on IMF |
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