01856cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000731 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451969337 1934-7456 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Giannini, Curzio. Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund / Curzio Giannini, Carlo Cottarelli. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1998. 1 online resource (26 pages) IMF Policy Discussion Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper argues that many developing countries may find it difficult to buttress disinflation programs purely through the adoption of traditional credibility-enhancing devices (such as monetary anchors and central bank independence), owing to 'technical problems' (for example, high instability of money demand, increased capital mobility) and an insufficient endowment of credibility in the political institutions. In these cases, borrowing credibility from an outside agency like the International Monetary Fund may be the most effective solution. The paper discusses the different options that would allow the Fund to support programs aimed not at external adjustment-the Fund's traditional role-but at disinflation. Mode of access: Internet Cottarelli, Carlo. IMF Policy Discussion Papers; Policy Discussion Paper ; No. 1998/012 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/003/1998/012/003.1998.issue-012-en.xml IMF e-Library