01500cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000795 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451841749 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Valila, Timo. Credibility of Central Bank Independence Revisited / Timo Valila. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999. 1 online resource (16 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The specific role of central bank independence in determining the overall credibility of monetary policy is addressed in this paper. It is argued that the credibility of delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is endogenous to the credibility of the inflation target because a 'conservative' inflation target may not be compatible with the fiscal policy stance. Also, lack of transparency in designing the institutional set-up is shown to be welfare-reducing. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/002 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/002/001.1999.issue-002-en.xml IMF e-Library