01778cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000958 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451851496 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Harm, Christian. Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State / Christian Harm, Joshua Charap. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999. 1 online resource (24 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state of pure anarchy. A dictator minimizes the probability of a palace revolution by creating a system of patronage and loyalty through corrupt bureaucracy. Competitive corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators implement a system of monopolistic corruption. Efforts at public sector reform may meet resistance in countries featuring such systemic corruption. Mode of access: Internet Charap, Joshua. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/091 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/091/001.1999.issue-091-en.xml IMF e-Library