01709cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000962 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451851700 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Sy, Amadou. Managerial Entrenchment and the Choice of Debt Financing / Amadou Sy. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999. 1 online resource (29 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The paper analyzes the choice between public and private debt by an entrenched manager. The model shows that when the firm's credit risk is low, management issues public bonds because of the value gains from increased flexibility rather than reduced restrictions and monitoring. In fact, management's expected private gains decrease as initial private debt restrictions are selectively relaxed. In contrast, when credit risk is high, management issues private debt because of the value gains and private benefits from renegotiating more stringent restrictions. When the maturity of private debt is shortened, however, privately and publicly placed bonds can be preferred to bank debt. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/094 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/094/001.1999.issue-094-en.xml IMF e-Library