01625cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF000973 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451852677 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Becker, Torbjorn. Public Debt Management and Bailouts / Torbjorn Becker. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999. 1 online resource (23 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper addresses how public debt should be managed to reduce the cost of private sector bailouts. It uses a tax smoothing model to show that bailouts affect the timing of government deficits and surpluses as well as the composition of public debt. In general, public debt managers will have to monitor the private sector's leverage and portfolio composition in order to design the tax smoothing policy. This contrasts with Ricardian models where households monitor the government's debt. The moral hazard aspect of defaults is also shown to be important in determining an optimal government debt strategy. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/103 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/103/001.1999.issue-103-en.xml IMF e-Library