01606cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001006 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451853087 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Kim, Se-Jik. Bailout and Conglomeration / Se-Jik Kim. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999. 1 online resource (29 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The paper suggests that when firms differ stochastically in their productivity, a bank may find it optimal not to bail out the failed nonconglomerate firms at all, but to bail out conglomerates fully. Expectation of such bailout policy may encourage risk-averse firms to join a conglomerate to minimize the risk of liquidation. Furthermore, in case of private information, bad firms follow good firms' decision on conglomeration to hide their type. Finally, the paper discusses the impact of conglomeration on the debt-equity ratio and the expansion of existing conglomerates through mergers and acquisitions. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/108 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/108/001.1999.issue-108-en.xml IMF e-Library