01739cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001057 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451856422 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Erbas, S. Can a Shorter Workweek Induce Higher Employment? : Mandatory Reductions in the Workweek and Employment Subsidies / S. Erbas, Chera Sayers. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999. 1 online resource (33 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students A reduction in the legal workweek may induce a degree of downward wage flexibility, while an employment subsidy to firms accommodates downward wage rigidity. It may be possible, therefore, to increase employment with a policy that combines a reduction in the workweek with an employment subsidy. In general, however, the long-run employment outcome is ambiguous, and a decline in output cannot be ruled out. More direct policy measures whose impact can be assessed with greater certainty-in particular, removing structural rigidities in the labor market-should be given priority to decrease long term unemployment. Mode of access: Internet Sayers, Chera. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/144 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/144/001.1999.issue-144-en.xml IMF e-Library