01587cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001106 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451841893 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Demirguc-Kunt, Asli. Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? / Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (29 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This study analyzes panel data for 61 countries during 1980-97 and concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive, when the scheme is funded, and when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector. Mode of access: Internet Detragiache, Enrica. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/003 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/003/001.2000.issue-003-en.xml IMF e-Library