A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper...
|a Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management /
|c G. Garcia.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2000.
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|a 1 online resource (80 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
500
|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2000/057
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/057/001.2000.issue-057-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library