01805cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001234 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451852813 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Kumar, Manmohan. Global Financial Crises : Institutions and Incentives / Manmohan Kumar, Paul Masson, Marcus Miller. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (25 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Increasing emphasis has been placed on the need for an effective lender of last resort for sovereign states and on procedures for sovereign debt restructuring to help cope with global financial crises. Where private creditors use short-term debt to check sovereign debtor's moral hazard, there is the risk of self-fulfilling crises. In this context, we conclude that the proposal of the Meltzer Commission-for unconditional financial support, but only to states that pre-qualify-could be the source of increased instability. After discussing analogies with private sector arrangements, we compare the operations of the existing Paris Club with proposed Chapter 11 style procedures. Mode of access: Internet Masson, Paul. Miller, Marcus. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/105 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/105/001.2000.issue-105-en.xml IMF e-Library