01688cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001273 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451853469 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Bidding Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions : Evidence From Pakistan. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (30 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Behavior in the first three years of auctions for Pakistani treasury bills is studied. Bidding strategies rapidly converged to a consistent pattern after the auctions started in 1991. Factors are identified that influenced the expected profitability of auction participation, which was on average low and did not differ between types of bidders. Prices bid are found to reflected both 'buy and sell' and 'buy and hold' strategies, and were affected by risk considerations and bidder-specific variables. The Pakistani experience suggests the robustness of auctions as a market-based allocation mechanism, and their value in public debt management. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/111 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/111/001.2000.issue-111-en.xml IMF e-Library