01635cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001351 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451858259 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Phillips, Steven. Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard? / Steven Phillips, Timothy Lane. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (39 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The view that the IMF's financial support gives rise to moral hazard has become increasingly prominent in policy discussions, particularly following the 1995 Mexican crisis. This paper seeks to clarify a number of conceptual issues and bring some basic empirical evidence to bear on this hypothesis. While some element of moral hazard is a logical consequence of the IMF's financial support, such moral hazard is difficult to detect in market reactions to various IMF policy announcements and there is no evidence that such moral hazard has recently been on the rise. Mode of access: Internet Lane, Timothy. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/168 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/168/001.2000.issue-168-en.xml IMF e-Library