01536cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001364 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451859027 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Jahjah, Samir. Inflation, Debt, and Default in a Monetary Union / Samir Jahjah. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (30 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Depending on the preferences of the central bank, countries in a monetary union tend to accumulate less debt. This reduces the need for fiscal criteria such as debt ceilings. In a monetary union with an independent central bank and a sufficiently large number of relatively small members, investors will begin rationing credit to the government more rapidly, and an equilibrium with no inflation and no default exists. However, highly-indebted countries are more likely to default once they join a monetary union. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/179 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/179/001.2000.issue-179-en.xml IMF e-Library