Inflation, Debt, and Default in a Monetary Union /
Depending on the preferences of the central bank, countries in a monetary union tend to accumulate less debt. This reduces the need for fiscal criteria such as debt ceilings. In a monetary union with an independent central bank and a sufficiently large number of relatively small members, investors w...
| Main Author: | Jahjah, Samir |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/179 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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