01835cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001396 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451845266 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Pattillo, Catherine. Monetary Union in West Africa : An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies? / Catherine Pattillo, Paul Masson. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (33 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Could a West African monetary union (either of the non-CFA countries, or all ECOWAS members) be an effective "agency of restraint" on fiscal policies? We discuss how monetary union could affect fiscal discipline and the arguments for explicit fiscal restraints considered in the European Monetary Union literature, and their applicability to West Africa. The empirical evidence, EMU literature, and CFA experience suggest that monetary union could create the temptation for fiscal profligacy through prospects of a bailout, or costs diluted through the membership. Thus, a West African monetary union could promote fiscal discipline only if the hands of the fiscal authorities are also tied by a strong set of fiscal restraints. Mode of access: Internet Masson, Paul. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/034 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/034/001.2001.issue-034-en.xml IMF e-Library