01659cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001413 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451851229 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Asilis, Carlos. Price Controls and Electoral Cycles / Carlos Asilis, Pierre-Richard Agenor. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1993. 1 online resource (24 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper studies the interactions between electoral considerations and the imposition of price controls by opportunistic policymakers. The analysis shows that a policy cycle emerges in which price controls are imposed in periods leading to the election, and removed immediately afterwards. The shape of the cycle is shown to depend on the periodicity of elections, the relative weight attached by the public to inflation as opposed to the macroeconomic distortions associated with price controls, the nature of wage contracts, and the degree of uncertainty about the term in office. Mode of access: Internet Agenor, Pierre-Richard. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1993/089 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1993/089/001.1993.issue-089-en.xml IMF e-Library