01801cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001460 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451848687 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Pisauro, Guiseppe. Intergovernmental Relations and Fiscal Discipline : Between Commons and Soft Budget Constraints / Guiseppe Pisauro. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (30 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Fiscal decentralization is likely to entail a bias in the budget process toward higher public expenses and deficits. The paper reviews lessons drawn from the theoretical literature and international experience on the design of intergovernmental relations. The institutional setup should address the dual problem of "common tax resources" and "soft" budget constraints, where policies devised to correct one problem may exacerbate the other. An approach based on full tax autonomy of lower-tier governments and reliance on market discipline, not supplemented by self-imposed constitutional limits, is not advisable. More effective seems to be a cooperative approach with some preeminence granted to the central government. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/065 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/065/001.2001.issue-065-en.xml IMF e-Library