01990cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001481 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451850543 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Kaufman, George. Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks : Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and too-Big-To-Fail / George Kaufman, Steven Seelig. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (23 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors' access to their claims is delayed or "frozen." While the sources and implications of losses at resolution have been analyzed previously, the sources and implications of losses after resolution have received little attention. This paper examines the causes of delayed depositors' access to their funds at resolved banks, describes how the FDIC provides immediate access, reports on a special survey of access practices in other countries, and analyzes the costs and benefits of delayed access in terms of both the effects on market discipline and depositor pressure to protect all deposits. Mode of access: Internet Seelig, Steven. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/083 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/083/001.2001.issue-083-en.xml IMF e-Library