01783cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001483 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451850369 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Scandizzo, Stefania. Intellectual Property Rights and International R and D Competition / Stefania Scandizzo. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (24 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines a country's incentives for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in a global trading environment. There is a time inconsistency problem intrinsic to IPR protection: ex ante strong protection is warranted to promote innovation, but once discovery takes place there is an incentive to lower protection. The sub optimal but time consistent policy involves an insufficient level of protection and, therefore, of innovation. In more technologically advanced economies reputational considerations may be sufficient to maintain strong protection. Otherwise a commitment mechanism, such as participation in the World Trade Organization, or, more controversially, some form of bilateral punishment, may be used. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/081 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/081/001.2001.issue-081-en.xml IMF e-Library