01699cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001491 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451851915 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Baqir, Reza. Districting and Government Overspending / Reza Baqir. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (48 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The common-pool problem is a central issue in the relationship between the political structure of jurisdictions and the size of public spending. Models predict that, other things being equal, greater political districting of a jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents new evidence on this and related predictions from a cross-section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that one additional legislator is associated, on average, with 3 percent larger expenditures per capita. Evidence also suggests that forms of government with strong executives, particularly those with veto powers, break the link between districting and government size. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/096 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/096/001.2001.issue-096-en.xml IMF e-Library