02009cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001559 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451842517 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Reviglio, Franco. Budgetary Transparency for Public Expenditure Control / Franco Reviglio. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (31 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper explains why EMU countries seem unable or unwilling to undertake structural reforms of public expenditure. One of the reasons is political. What public expenditure reforms might be pursued without changing the political system? Without political reforms, technical improvements made to increase budget transparency, such as strengthening budget procedure, integrating accrual into cash accounting, and removing accounting gimmicks, could indirectly affect reforms of public expenditure. Removing gimmicks and helping prevent the emergence of new creative accounting techniques may be a partial substitue for political reforms. Implementation of the Growth and Stability Pact should be dynamically consistent with budgetary transparency. Although other EMU countries resorted as well to budgetary gimmicks to bypass difficult fiscal constraints, the Italian case is used as a reference to clarify these issues. Transparency may help discourage the use of gim micks. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/008 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/008/001.2001.issue-008-en.xml IMF e-Library