01836cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001599 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451851595 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Becker, Torbjorn. Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard : Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? / Torbjorn Becker, Anthony Richards, Yunyong Thaicharoen. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (41 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and increased borrowing costs. This paper addresses this question empirically using primary and secondary market yields and finds no evidence that the presence of collective action clauses increases yields for either higher- or lower-rated issuers. By implication, the perceived benefits from easier restructuring are at least as large as any costs from increased moral hazard. Mode of access: Internet Richards, Anthony. Thaicharoen, Yunyong. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/092 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/092/001.2001.issue-092-en.xml IMF e-Library