01685cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001742 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451857818 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Ruge-Murcia, Francisco. Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences / Francisco Ruge-Murcia. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (54 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. Specifically, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to this generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the one implied by the commonly-used quadratic loss function. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/161 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/161/001.2001.issue-161-en.xml IMF e-Library