Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto /
Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more p...
|a Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto /
|c Reza Baqir.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2001.
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|a 1 online resource (30 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2001/208
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/208/001.2001.issue-208-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library