01707cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001812 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451874709 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Baqir, Reza. Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto / Reza Baqir. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (30 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/208 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/208/001.2001.issue-208-en.xml IMF e-Library