01951cas a2200289 a 4500 AALejournalIMF001982 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451853872 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni. Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs / Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Tito Cordella. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002. 1 online resource (24 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resources. Under such conditions, the optimal amount of conditionality varies (often not monotonically) with the recipients' degree of social commitment. Finally, if recipients' preferences are not observable, conditionality can be used to prevent recipients with a weak commitment to poverty reduction from obtaining aid funds. This may however lead to further distortions in terms of resource allocation and to phenomena of "aid rationing.". Mode of access: Internet Government Policy imf Provision and Effects Of Welfare Program imf WP imf Cordella, Tito. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/115 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/115/001.2002.issue-115-en.xml IMF e-Library