01991cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002013 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451855920 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Stella, Peter. Central Bank Financial Strength, Transparency, and Policy Credibility / Peter Stella. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002. 1 online resource (42 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students A central bank is financially strong if it possesses resources sufficient to attain its fundamental policy objective(s). Once endowed with those resources, relations between government and central bank should be designed so that significant changes in central bank financial strength do not occur unless necessitated by changes in policy objectives. The level of strength required depends on the array of policy objectives (for example, the exchange rate regime) as well as the constraints and risks presented by the operational environment. Attaining credibility is facilitated if the public can easily determine the financial strength of the bank, yet for a variety of reasons this is often difficult. Transparency requires institutional arrangements that ensure the central bank generates profit in most states of the world, is subject to strict ex post independent audit, and transfers regularly all profits, after provisions, to the treasury. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/137 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/137/001.2002.issue-137-en.xml IMF e-Library