01759cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002164 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451859201 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni. Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending : A Test / Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Isabel Schnabel. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002. 1 online resource (55 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students We test for the existence of a moral hazard effect attributable to official crisis lending by analyzing the evolution of sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets before and after the Russian crisis. The nonbailout of Russia in August 1998 is interpreted as an event that decreased the perceived probability of future crisis lending to emerging markets. In the presence of moral hazard, such an event should raise not only the level of spreads, but also the sensitivity with which spreads reflect fundamentals as well as their cross-country dispersion. We find strong evidence for all three effects. Mode of access: Internet Schnabel, Isabel. Zettelmeyer, Jeromin. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/181 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/181/001.2002.issue-181-en.xml IMF e-Library