01777cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002182 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451859829 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Giannini, Curzio. Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? : Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending / Curzio Giannini, Carlo Cottarelli. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002. 1 online resource (50 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students During the 1990s, the concept of "catalytic official finance" (COF) gained prominence in policy debates. The concept revolves around the idea that the propensity of investors to lend to a country increases when the IMF provides its "seal of approval"-backed up by only limited official financing-on the country's economic program. COF aims at avoiding, on the one hand, the massive use of public money to bail out private investors; on the other, the recourse to coercive bailing-in mechanisms. The paper concludes that COF, while possibly useful in other contexts, is less reliable when used to manage capital account crises. Mode of access: Internet Cottarelli, Carlo. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/193 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/193/001.2002.issue-193-en.xml IMF e-Library