01742cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002206 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451874662 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Zoli, Edda. Modis : A Market-Oriented Deposit Insurance Scheme / Edda Zoli, Danyang Xie, Reza Vaez-Zadeh. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002. 1 online resource (33 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper argues that an optimal deposit insurance scheme would allow the level of insurance coverage to be determined by the market. Based on this principle, the paper proposes an insurance scheme that minimizes distortions and embodies fairness and credibility, two essential characteristics of a viable and effective deposit insurance scheme. Using a simple model for the determination of the optimal level of insurance coverage, it is shown that the optimal coverage is higher for developing compared to developed countries; a condition that is broadly satisfied by prevailing deposit insurance practices around the world. Mode of access: Internet Vaez-Zadeh, Reza. Xie, Danyang. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/207 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/207/001.2002.issue-207-en.xml IMF e-Library