01754cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002275 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451847406 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Gutierrez, Eva. Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence : Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean / Eva Gutierrez. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2003. 1 online resource (30 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper explores the relationship between the constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance. Empirical studies for developing countries have not found a relationship between central bank independence, proxied by the "de jure" independence established in the central bank law, and inflation. We argue that the constitution is likely to be better enforced than ordinary statutes owing to its higher legal rank. Our empirical analysis finds that in a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, those countries that entrench the independence of the central bank in the constitution have a better inflation performance. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2003/053 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2003/053/001.2003.issue-053-en.xml IMF e-Library