01817cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002628 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451859331 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Huang, Haizhou. Monetary Policies for Developing Countries : The Role of Corruption / Haizhou Huang, Shang-Jin Wei. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2003. 1 online resource (28 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines the role of corruption in the design of monetary policies for developing countries in a framework of fiscal and monetary interaction and obtains several interesting results. First, pegged exchange rates, currency boards, or dollarization, while often prescribed as a solution to the problem of a lack of credibility for developing countries, is typically not credible in countries with serious corruption. Second, the optimal degree of conservatism for a Rogoff (1985)-type central banker is an inverse function of the corruption level. Third, either an optimally designed inflation target or an optimal-conservative central banker is preferable to an exchange rate peg, currency board, or dollarization. Mode of access: Internet Wei, Shang-Jin. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2003/183 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2003/183/001.2003.issue-183-en.xml IMF e-Library