01859cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002675 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451848465 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Masson, Paul. Portfolio Preference Uncertainty and Gains From Policy Coordination / Paul Masson. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1991. 1 online resource (26 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students International macroeconomic policy coordination is generally considered to be made less likely-and less profitable-by the presence of uncertainty about how the economy works. The present paper provides a counter-example, in which increased uncertainty about portfolio preference of investors makes coordination of monetary policy more beneficial. In particular, in the absence of coordination monetary authorities may respond to financial market uncertainty by not fully accommodating demands for increased liquidity, for fear of bringing about exchange rate depreciation. Coordinated monetary expansion would minimize this danger. A theoretical model incorporating an equity market is developed, and the stock market crash of October 1987 is discussed in the light of its implications for monetary policy coordination. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1991/064 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1991/064/001.1991.issue-064-en.xml IMF e-Library