01793cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002898 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451848823 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Ize, Alain. Prudential Responses to De Facto Dollarization / Alain Ize, Andrew Powell. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. 1 online resource (41 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students We develop a theoretical framework that encompasses four distinct motives for dollarization and discuss appropriate policy responses to help contain dollarization and its attendant risks. "Moral hazard" dollarization provides a clear case for prudential policy activism. However, prudential reform will have only a limited impact on dollarization when the main culprits are fear of floating and lack of monetary credibility. In such cases, a concerted and comprehensive reform agenda, including market-oriented and institutional reforms, would be needed to shift the balance of risks in favor of the domestic currency. While quantitative limits on dollarization could also be used to speed up de-dollarization, risks could be high. Mode of access: Internet Powell, Andrew. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/066 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/066/001.2004.issue-066-en.xml IMF e-Library