01859cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002920 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451848311 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Kopits, George. Fiscal Indulgence in Central Europe : Loss of the External Anchor / George Kopits, Helge Berger, Istvan Szekely. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. 1 online resource (23 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries slated for EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes-allowing for regime shifts-depending on country characteristics and EU policies. Mode of access: Internet Berger, Helge. Szekely, Istvan. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/062 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/062/001.2004.issue-062-en.xml IMF e-Library