01803cas a2200301 a 4500 AALejournalIMF002984 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451853896 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Erbas, S. Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength / S. Erbas. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. 1 online resource (32 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Institutional transparency makes future contingencies more easily predictable for investors. Greater transparency can be achieved through vertical and horizontal integration of policy rules, which may result in lower Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity). In a model based on cumulative prospect theory, for a given probability and payoff structure, expected return on investment is higher in more transparent countries; therefore, those countries attract more investment and grow faster than less transparent countries. Lower transparency may result in inherently higher volatility. Mode of access: Internet Analysis Of Collective Decision-Making imf Expected Return imf Horizontal Integration imf Vertical Integration imf WP imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/115 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/115/001.2004.issue-115-en.xml IMF e-Library