01798cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003006 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451851755 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Aisen, Ari. Money-Based Versus Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization : Is There Space for Political Opportunism? / Ari Aisen. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. 1 online resource (35 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students In response to high and chronic inflation, countries have adopted different stabilization policies. However, the extent to which these stabilization programs were designed for political motives is not clear. Since exchange-rate-based stabilizations (ERBS) create an initial consumption boom followed by a contraction, whereas money-based stabilizations (MBS) generate a consumption bust followed by a recovery, policymakers may consider the timing of elections when determining the nominal anchor for stabilization. This paper finds strong evidence that the choice of nominal anchor depends on elections, implying the existence of political opportunism. ERBS are, on average, launched before elections while MBS are set after them. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/094 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/094/001.2004.issue-094-en.xml IMF e-Library