01630cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003026 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451852301 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Chamon, Marcos. Can Debt Crises Be Self-Fulfilling? / Marcos Chamon. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. 1 online resource (21 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Several papers argue that debt crises can be the result of self-fulfilling expectations that no one will lend to a country. I show this type of coordination failure can be eliminated by a combination of state-contingent securities and a mechanism that allows investors to promise to lend only if enough other investors do so as well. This suggests that runs on the debt of a single borrower (such as the government) can be eliminated, and that self-fulfilling features are more plausible when articulated in a context in which externalities among many decentralized borrowers allow for economy-wide debt runs to occur. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/099 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/099/001.2004.issue-099-en.xml IMF e-Library